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Fernandez v. Fernandez, 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 3 (Feb. 04, 2010)1
Family Law- Modifying Child Support
Summary
Reverse and remand of the trial court’s affirmation to the question of whether parents
can, by stipulation, eliminate or abridge a trial court’s statutory authority to review and modify a
child support order.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court answered the question in the negative concluding that modification statutes
NRS 125B.145(4), NRS 125B.070, and NRS 125B.080 apply to appeals to review and modify
child support orders.
Factual and Procedural History
Anthony Fernandez, appellant, and Jennifer Fernandez, respondent, had two children
prior to the court granting their joint petition for divorce in August 1998.
The original divorce decree awarded the parents joint legal custody of the children,
giving primary physical custody to the mother. The decree obligated the father to pay child
support of $3,000 per month. While the decree stated the child support was “consistent with the
provisions of NRS 125B.070,” it actually exceeded NRS 125B.070’s presumptive maximum. 2
In July 1999, the trial court approved an increase in the father’s monthly child support
obligations from $3,000 to $4,000.
In June 2000, the court approved a new stipulation between the parents. This stipulation
provided for joint physical custody in both parents. While this stipulation left the amount of
child support obligations unchanged, it also purportedly made the child support obligation
nonmodifiable, stating that both parties “voluntarily waive any right they may have pursuant to
Chapter 125 B of the Nevada Revised Statutes to seek a modification to [father’s] child support
obligations to [mother].”
In 2007, the father’s child support obligations amounted to $80,000 a year. From 19952001 the father earned sums ranging from $500,000 to more than $4,000,000. However, high
losses in the market in 2002 led to his inability to trade at his prior high levels and by 2007 he no
longer traded and was earning only $3,000 a month selling cars.
In 2007, the father filed the motion to modify underlying this appeal. At this time both
he and the mother had roughly equal passive and earned income. 3
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By Jennifer Shrum
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.070 (2009) and NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.080 (2009) set presumptive limits on child
support keyed to the number of children and the obligor parent’s gross monthly income, with a $100 minimum and
$800 maximum per child per month, adjusted by the Consumer Price Index.
3
At this time the father and mother each separately had an additional child to support.
2

The trial court declined to review the father’s motion under NRS 125B.145. Instead, the
trial court ordered a limited hearing to address whether the waiver made the child support order
nonmodifiable.
The trial court denied the father’s motion to modify, holding that “the child support
provisions of the [decree and its stipulated modifications] shall not be disturbed by the Court
based upon the waivers of the parties set forth therein and upon the fact that [the father] still has
the ability to pay said amount from his currently held assets.” The trial court further stated that
“the Court is not bound by the provisions of NRS 125B.145 where the parties have previously
agreed in a stipulation and order modifying the Decree of Divorce that neither party will seek
modification of child support.”
The father appealed. The Eight Judicial District Court addressed the question of whether
parents can, by stipulation, eliminate or abridge a trial court’s statutory authority to review and
modify a child support order. The mother maintained that the parties’ agreement to
nonmodifiable child support should be upheld as a matter of contract law and equity, based on
her part performance. The father asserted that when the parties incorporated the support
agreement into the decree, it ceased being a matter of private contract and became a judicially
imposed obligation, at which point the statutory modification provisions of NRS 125B.070 and
NRS 125B.080 apply, notwithstanding the parties’ agreement to the contrary. Relying on NRS
125B.145(1)(b), the father urged that the award should have been modified to conform to the
formulas in NRS 125B.070 and NRS 125B.080 without regard to changed circumstances, since
more than three years had passed since the award’s last review; failing that he urged that he
demonstrated sufficient change in circumstances to warrant modification.
Discussion
While Nevada’s child support statutes do not directly address whether parents can
stipulate to a nonmodifiable child support order, Nevada’s child support statutes establish that
child support involves more than private contract.
I. Child Support Orders
The trial court has continuing jurisdiction over its child support orders. 4 In 2003 NRS
125B.145(4) was clarified stating that “[a]n order for the support of a child may be reviewed at
any time on the basis of changed circumstances.” 5 Further, a change of 20 percent or more in a
child support obligor’s gross monthly income “shall be deemed to constitute changed
circumstances requiring a review for modification of the order for the support of the child.” 6
Upon the request of the parent or legal guardian, “[a]n order for the support of a child must . . .
be reviewed by the court at least every 3 years . . . to determine whether the order should be
modified or adjusted.” 7 Finally, “[i]f the court . . . [h]as jurisdiction to modify the order and,
taking into account the best interests of the child determines that modification or adjustment of
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.510(1)(b) states that once a trial court determines custody it may “[a]t any time modify or
vacate” its support and custody orders.
5
Id. § 125B.145.
6
Id.
7
Id. § 125B.145(1)(b).

the order is appropriate, the court shall enter an order modifying or adjusting the previous order
for support in accordance with the requirements of NRS 125B.070 and 125B.080.” 8

II. Child Support Order Modifications
The Court stated that had the Legislature wanted to give parents the option of agreement
to a decree providing for nonmodifiable child support, it could have easily provided an exception
to NRS 125B.145. 9 Currently, Nevada’s child support modification statutes say nothing about
parental agreements. Thus, the Court stated, public policy prevents a court from enforcing a
purportedly nonmodifiable child support order, even if the parties stipulate to it.
The mother argued that public policy supports nonmodification agreements when applied
to preclude downward modification, no matter the impact on the obligor parent, reasoning that
more support will always serve the child’s best interest. The Court found that neither Nevada
statutes nor public policy supports this argument. The formula and guideline statutes intend child
support payments to meet the child’s needs, to be fair to both parents, and to be met without
impoverishing the obligor parent. 10
The Court also stated that when agreed-upon support is incorporated into a decree, it
becomes a court order. Court-ordered child support is not a fixed obligation but is subject to
readjustment as circumstances may direct. 11 The Court found that the trial court failed to follow
the statutes as written when it justified its decision by stating that the father still had assets he
could use to pay child support, even if the support obligation exceeded his gross income. The
trial court’s test resembled more closely the “undue hardship” standard in the enforcement
statutes, than the changed circumstance standard in the modifications statutes. 12
The Court concluded that the trial court erred in declaring the modification statutes not
applicable to the father’s motion and reversed and remanded for proceedings under NRS
125B.145(4), NRS 125B.070, and NRS 125B.080.
III. The Mother’s Part Performance.
The mother maintained that her part performance of the nonmodifiabiltiy stipulation
estopped the father from contesting enforceability. The Court found that the stipulation waiving
modification rights was entered after the property settlement between the parties was concluded
and the support obligations were set. The Court concluded that estoppel is not available to
resurrect the contract right that public policy invalidates. 13
IV. Scope of Proceedings on Remand
8

Id. § 125B.145(2)(b).
See Amodio v. Amodio, 56 Conn. App. 459, 471, 743 A.2d 1135, 1143 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) (discussing CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 46b-86(a) , which provides for modification based on changed circumstances “unless and to the extent
the decree precludes modification”).
10
See Barbagallo v. Barbagallo, 105 Nev. 546, 551, 779 P.2d 532, 536 (1989) (“[w]hat really matters...is whether
the children are being taken care of as well as possible under the financial circumstances in which the two parents
find themselves.”).
11
Riemer v. Riemer, 73 Nev. 197, 199, 314 P.2d 381, 383 (1957).
12
NEV. REV. STAT. § 125B.140(c)(2).
13
Krieman v. Goldberg, 214 Wis. 2d 163, 177, 571 N.W.2d 425, 432 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
9

The Court stated that in order for the father to prevail on his modification motion on remand,
the father must demonstrate changed circumstances. 14 The Court differentiated between the
custody setting, in which NRS 125.480(1) makes the best interest of the child “the sole
consideration,” and the support setting in which the parents’ and the child’s best interest are
interwoven.
Conclusion
So long as the statutory criteria for modification are met, a “trial court always has the
power to modify an existing child support order, either upward or downward, notwithstanding
the parties’ agreement to the contrary.” 15
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Rivero v. Rivero, 125 Nev. __, ___, 216 P.3d 213, 228 (2009).
In re Marriage of Alter, 171 Cal. App. 4th 718, 722, 89 Cal Rptr. 3d 849, 852 (Ct. App. 2009).

